ἐγώ (Egō): From “I” to “the Self” in Ancient Greek

commentary

Historical and lexical commentary on the first-person pronoun, its development in Greek literature and philosophy, and its distinction from αὐτός.

Greek: ἐγώ
Transliteration: egṓ
Part of speech: First-person personal pronoun, nominative singular
Primary meaning: I
Extended uses: I myself; I for my part; the speaking subject; the I; the Ego or Self in specialized philosophical language.

Principal lexical reference: ἐγώ — Logeion, University of Chicago


Introduction: The Difference Between “I” and “Myself”

The Greek pronoun ἐγώ is usually translated simply as “I.” Yet its history reveals an important distinction between the person who speaks and the self that can become the subject of reflection.

English uses I, me, myself, self, and ego for related but different concepts. Ancient Greek likewise distinguishes several functions, principally through ἐγώ, αὐτός, and their reflexive combinations.

The basic distinction is:

The distinction matters because the grammatical identification of a speaker is not identical to a philosophical account of what makes that speaker a self.

A person can say “I” without explaining what that “I” is.

Indeed, the history of Greek philosophy increasingly turns precisely this apparently simple pronoun into a question: Who, or what, is the “I” that speaks?

1. Etymology: The Ancient Indo-European “I”

The Greek ἐγώ belongs to an ancient Indo-European family of first-person pronouns.

Its cognates include:

Language Pronoun Meaning
Ancient Greek ἐγώ I
Latin ego I
Sanskrit ahám I
English I I
German ich I

The forms are related historically, although they have developed through different phonological changes.

The oblique cases of Greek ἐγώ preserve other inherited pronominal stems. Consequently, the nominative and oblique forms do not all derive transparently from the same immediate root.

Case Full form Short form Meaning
Nominative ἐγώ — I
Genitive ἐμοῦ μου Of me
Dative ἐμοί μοι To or for me
Accusative ἐμέ με Me

Greek also originally possessed a dual number, νῶι, meaning “we two,” alongside the plural ἡμεῖς, “we.”

Thus, the grammatical family of ἐγώ already distinguishes an individual speaker, two speakers considered together, and a group including the speaker.

These forms establish who is being referred to. They do not, by themselves, define the philosophical nature of personal identity.

2. Homer: The “I” as Speaker and Agent (c. eighth–seventh centuries BCE)

The earliest extensive literary evidence comes from Homeric epic.

Homer uses both ἐγώ and the poetic form ἐγών, the latter especially before vowels.

In the Iliad 1.29, Agamemnon declares:

τὴν δ’ ἐγὼ οὐ λύσω

“I will not release her.”

The first-person ending of the verb already identifies Agamemnon as the speaker. The additional ἐγώ brings the speaking agent explicitly into the assertion.

Here the pronoun participates in the language of determination, authority, and personal commitment.

Homeric speech frequently places individuals in conflict, and an expressed ἐγώ can distinguish the speaker’s position from the wishes or actions of others.

This is not yet a technical philosophical concept of the ego. It is the ordinary first person functioning within a world of interpersonal obligations, promises, commands, and disputes.

An especially interesting Homeric expression occurs in the Odyssey 21.207:

ὅδ’ αὐτὸς ἐγώ

“This is I myself, here present.”

Here ἐγώ and αὐτός appear together.

The former identifies the speaker; the latter reinforces the identity of the person present. The demonstrative ὅδε directs attention to the person being revealed.

This combination demonstrates that Greek could express both first-person reference and emphatic personal identity without treating the two functions as identical.

3. Archaic Lyric: The Situated “I” (seventh–fifth centuries BCE)

In lyric poetry, the first person becomes an important instrument of poetic presentation.

Authors such as Sappho, Alcaeus, Alcman, and Pindar employ first-person forms in contexts of desire, memory, performance, praise, and personal experience.

The dialectal evidence is especially rich.

LSJ records forms such as the Aeolic ἐμέθεν, found in Sappho, and several Doric and Boeotian variants.

These forms demonstrate the geographical and literary diversity of the Greek first-person system.

In <em>Pindar, Olympian</em> 4.26, LSJ cites:

οὗτος ἐγώ

“Here I am.”

The demonstrative and pronoun combine to identify the speaker within the immediate situation.

The lyric “I” can be intimate, celebratory, or authoritative. Yet one must distinguish the grammatical speaker from the historical author. A poem’s first person may represent a performed voice, dramatic persona, or conventional poetic role.

The significance is that ἐγώ is relational and deictic: it identifies whoever occupies the speaking position in a particular utterance.

Its reference changes whenever the speaker changes.

4. Classical Drama: The “I” That Identifies Itself (fifth century BCE)

Greek tragedy frequently uses ἐγώ in declarations, recognitions, confrontations, and expressions of suffering.

In Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus 138, LSJ records:

ὅδ’ ἐκεῖνος ἐγώ

An approximate rendering is:

“I here am that very one.”

The construction combines three distinct elements:

ὅδε — this one here.
ἐκεῖνος — that one.
ἐγώ — I.

The expression joins a presently identified speaker with a previously recognized or described identity.

It is particularly suggestive in a drama concerned with who Oedipus is, what he has become, and how others recognize him.

But the Greek should not be overinterpreted. The construction establishes identification between the present speaker and the person previously mentioned; it does not itself demonstrate a philosophical theory of personal continuity.

In comedy, meanwhile, ἐγώ can stand alone as a surprised question.

Aristophanes, Knights 1336, provides such an example:

ἐγώ;

“Me?”

The expression can indicate surprise, disbelief, or a request for clarification.

This is a useful reminder that the same pronoun serves very different purposes depending upon its discourse setting.

5. Plato: From the Speaking “I” to Knowing Oneself (fourth century BCE)

With Plato, questions of identity and self-knowledge receive sustained philosophical attention.

A central distinction emerges between the person who says “I” and the nature of the person thus identified.

In Plato’s Theaetetus 166a and Sophist 239b, the unusual articular expression τὸν ἐμέ appears.

LSJ glosses this construction as “myself.”

Unlike the ordinary unarticulated personal pronoun, the article permits the expression to function substantively: the person designated by “me” becomes something referred to as a particular subject.

However, the clearest discussion of self-knowledge appears in the dialogue Alcibiades I, traditionally transmitted among Plato’s works, although its authenticity remains disputed.

At 129a the famous Delphic command appears:

γνῶναι ἑαυτόν

“To know oneself.”

Notice that the expression does not use ἐγώ. It employs the reflexive pronoun ἑαυτόν, the accusative of ἑαυτοῦ.

The dialogue then investigates the nature of the person who is to be known.

At 129b it asks:

τί ποτ’ ἐσμὲν αὐτοί

“What exactly are we ourselves?”

The discussion distinguishes the individual from the body that the individual uses, eventually associating the person most fundamentally with the soul.

At 130e the inquiry reaches the conclusion that the injunction to know oneself directs attention toward knowledge of the soul.

This reveals a fundamental difference:

ἐγώ identifies the speaker, whereas the reflexive construction makes the speaker’s own nature the object of inquiry.

Greek does not need a specialized noun equivalent to the modern English “self” to investigate selfhood. It can do so through personal pronouns, reflexive pronouns, the language of soul (ψυχή), and philosophical argument.

6. Aristotle: The Self in Relation to Another (fourth century BCE)

Aristotle introduces another important dimension.

In the Nicomachean Ethics 9.4 (1166a), he writes:

ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός

“For the friend is another self.”

This construction uses αὐτός, not ἐγώ.

The phrase is significant because the self is understood through a relationship with another person.

Elsewhere, Aristotle speaks of the friend as ἕτερος αὐτός, another self, connecting friendship with shared living, awareness, and mutual recognition.

The self is not simply the isolated subject of an individual assertion. It becomes a point of comparison through which relationships can be understood.

A similar formulation is transmitted as a saying attributed to Pythagoras:

τί ἐστι φίλος; ἄλλος ἐγώ.

“What is a friend? Another I.”

LSJ cites the saying through the later commentator Hermias, In Phaedrum, p. 166.

The attribution is indirect and should not be treated as secure evidence of Pythagoras’ own wording. Nevertheless, the expression is revealing.

Compare the two formulations:

The first emphasizes a correspondence of identity or personhood.

The second expresses that correspondence from the first-person standpoint.

Although the two may function similarly, their grammatical perspectives are distinct.

7. Hellenistic and New Testament Greek: The “I” as Confession, Identity, and Transformation

In Koine Greek, ἐγώ continues its established grammatical functions, but religious literature introduces especially consequential contexts.

The New Testament lexicon of Abbott-Smith observes that an explicitly expressed nominative ἐγώ is often emphatic, although emphasis is not present in every occurrence.

The distinction matters because Greek finite verbs normally identify their grammatical subjects without requiring an additional pronoun.

ἐγώ εἰμι — “I am”

In John 8:58, Jesus declares:

πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι ἐγὼ εἰμί

“Before Abraham was born, I am.”

The expression juxtaposes γενέσθαι, the aorist infinitive of becoming or coming into existence, with εἰμί, the present tense of being.

The explicit ἐγώ identifies the subject of this assertion.

The unusually constructed temporal comparison invites interpretations concerning existence and identity, particularly within the theological setting of John’s Gospel.

Yet ἐγώ εἰμι is not intrinsically a divine title whenever it appears. The same words can function as an ordinary statement of identification, as in John 9:9.

Its theological significance must therefore be established through context, not through an invented special meaning of ἐγώ.

Paul: “No longer I”

An especially striking treatment of the first person appears in Galatians 2:20:

ζῶ δὲ οὐκέτι ἐγώ, ζῇ δὲ ἐν ἐμοὶ Χριστός

“I live, yet no longer I; the anointed one lives in me.”

Paul “the Small One” uses the first-person singular twice, but distinguishes between the speaker who continues to live and the “I” whose former mode of life is being displaced.

The grammatical subject remains Paul, while the sentence describes a radical transformation in the identity and agency associated with that subject.

In the continuation, Paul again speaks of the life he now lives in the flesh.

Thus, “no longer I” cannot simply mean that the speaker has ceased to exist. One “I” is exchanged for another.

There is also a significant combination of grammatical forms later in the verse:

παραδόντος ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ ἐμοῦ

“Who surrendered himself for the sake of me.”

Here ἑαυτόν describes the anointed one reflexively, whereas ἐμοῦ identifies Paul as the beneficiary.

Once again, the language distinguishes the one who refers to himself from the one who is the object or beneficiary of an action.

The remarkable feature of Paul’s statement is not that ἐγώ acquires a new dictionary meaning. It is that an ordinary first-person pronoun becomes the center of an argument about transformed identity.

8. Plutarch: “Who Is This I?” (first–second centuries CE)

Perhaps the most direct evidence for the philosophical use of ἐγώ occurs in Plutarch’s Against Colotes 21, at Moralia 1119.

Plutarch presents the question:

τίς ὢν οὗτος ὁ ἐγὼ τυγχάνω;

Approximately:

“Who is this ‘I’ that I happen to be?”

The wording is extraordinary because it places the article ὁ before ἐγώ.

The pronoun, ordinarily used to identify a speaker, is now being discussed as something requiring explanation.

Plutarch proceeds to consider several possibilities.

Is the person a combination of soul and body? Is the person the soul using the body, like a rider using a horse? Is the person chiefly the ruling, thinking part of the soul? Or does the body’s organization account for thought and life without a separate soul-substance?

The passage therefore does not merely ask who someone is in the ordinary biographical sense.

It asks what constitutes the individual who says “I.”

This is a genuine philosophical investigation into the nature of selfhood.

It also demonstrates why ἐγώ should not be equated automatically with αὐτός.

The term ὁ ἐγώ makes the first-person subject itself into an object of examination. The reflexive expressions in the surrounding discussion describe the person considering himself.

The first-person perspective and the reflexive relation are inseparable in the argument, but grammatically distinct.

9. Plotinus: The “We” as the True Self (third century CE)

The philosopher Plotinus develops the discussion further.

Surprisingly, his distinctive philosophical expression is often not the singular ἐγώ, but the plural ἡμεῖς — “we.”

In Enneads 1.1.7, he writes:

ἔνθα δὴ ἡμεῖς μάλιστα

“There, indeed, we most truly are.”

The surrounding discussion investigates the relationship between the soul, bodily experience, perception, thought, and intellect.

Plotinus distinguishes different levels of what belongs to us.

The body and its experiences are not simply denied, but the person’s deepest identity is associated with higher intellectual activity.

He writes in the same passage:

τὰ δὲ πρὸ τούτων ἡμέτερα

“The things before these are ours.”

This distinction between ἡμεῖς (“we”) and ἡμέτερα (“ours”) is fundamental.

Something can belong to us without constituting what we most fundamentally are.

The implication is that the self cannot necessarily be identified with everything that a person possesses, experiences, or undergoes.

Plotinus therefore uses the first-person plural to investigate human identity itself.

His conception is not simply that multiple individuals form one collective ego. Rather, the plural serves as a way of discussing human subjectivity and the different levels at which we can identify ourselves.

In modern scholarship, Pauliina Remes has examined this distinctive terminology in Plotinus on Self: The Philosophy of the “We”.

The importance of Plotinus lies in the explicit separation between what is ours and what constitutes us.

This introduces a highly developed philosophical distinction that the ordinary pronoun ἐγώ alone does not express.

10. Damascius: The “I” as a Philosophical Term (fifth–sixth centuries CE)

The later Neoplatonist Damascius provides the rare expression that LSJ explicitly glosses:

ὁ ἐγώ — “the Self, the Ego.”

The lexicon cites his De Principiis (On First Principles), p. 444 in the cited edition.

The occurrence is notable because the grammatical article turns the first-person pronoun into a substantival expression.

We can distinguish:

ἐγώ — “I.”

ὁ ἐγώ — “the I,” considered as an identifiable subject.

This does not establish that every earlier occurrence of ἐγώ secretly contained the later philosophical meaning.

Rather, it demonstrates that Greek writers could employ ordinary grammatical material to formulate increasingly specialized philosophical questions.

By late antiquity, the “I” itself could be explicitly discussed as a subject of metaphysical investigation.

11. ἐγώ Versus αὐτός: Two Different Perspectives

The historical evidence allows a clearer distinction between the two Greek words.

Greek Basic function Possible English equivalent
ἐγώ First-person reference I
ἔγωγε Emphasized first person I for my part
αὐτός Identity or intensification Self, himself, the very one
ὁ αὐτός Sameness The same
ἐγὼ αὐτός First person plus emphasis I myself
ἐμαυτόν First-person reflexive Myself
ἑαυτόν Reflexive reference Himself, herself, itself; oneself
ὁ ἐγώ Substantivized first person The I, the Ego
ἡμεῖς First-person plural We; philosophically, ourselves

Three differences deserve particular attention.

First: ἐγώ is perspectival

The reference of ἐγώ depends upon who is speaking.

When Socrates says “I,” it identifies Socrates. When Alcibiades says the same word, it identifies Alcibiades.

The word does not designate one permanent individual.

Its reference is determined by the act of speech.

Second: αὐτός concerns identity or sameness

Unlike ἐγώ, αὐτός is not restricted to the first person.

It can emphasize any grammatical person or thing.

For example:

αὐτὸς ὁ Σωκράτης

“Socrates himself.”

ὁ αὐτὸς Σωκράτης

“The same Socrates.”

The change in article placement changes the construction’s meaning.

The first emphasizes the person himself; the second establishes sameness.

Neither requires the speaker to be Socrates.

Third: Reflexivity is not identical to first-person subjectivity

Consider:

ἐγὼ βλέπω

“I see.”

ἐγὼ βλέπω ἐμαυτόν

“I see myself.”

In the first sentence, the speaker is the subject of seeing.

In the second, the speaker is also the object of the action.

The introduction of the reflexive pronoun establishes a relationship between the subject and itself.

It does not follow that the two constructions express the same conceptual function.

This distinction is essential to understanding how Greek authors discuss self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and personal identity.

12. Does ἐγώ Mean “The Self”?

The answer depends upon the period, construction, and context.

In Homer and most classical prose, ἐγώ means “I.”

In emphatic constructions, it can express “I myself” or “I for my part,” particularly when reinforced by particles or other pronouns.

In later philosophical discussions, however, the first-person pronoun can become the object of an inquiry into what constitutes the speaking individual.

Plutarch’s ὁ ἐγώ and the later philosophical use recorded by LSJ make this particularly clear.

Plotinus’ use of ἡμεῖς extends the inquiry beyond the singular speaker into a theory of the human subject and its different levels.

Yet there is no single Greek word that universally corresponds to the full modern philosophical concept of the self.

Ancient Greek thinkers employ a constellation of terms, including:

ἐγώ — I
αὐτός — self, same
ἑαυτός — oneself
ψυχή — soul
νοῦς — intellect
ἄνθρωπος — human being
ἡμεῖς — we

These terms participate in different philosophical accounts of what a human person is.

Consequently, translating every philosophical reference to selfhood as though it were equivalent to an independent, self-contained “ego” risks imposing modern assumptions upon ancient texts.

Conclusion: From the One Who Speaks to the One Being Examined

The history of ἐγώ reveals a remarkable continuity.

From Homer onward, the pronoun identifies the individual who occupies the speaking position.

In epic and drama, it participates in declarations, recognition, commitment, conflict, and personal testimony.

In philosophical dialogue, attention increasingly turns toward the identity of the one who speaks.

Plutarch makes the movement explicit by asking who this “I” actually is.

Plotinus further distinguishes between what belongs to us and what we most fundamentally are.

Finally, the rare philosophical expression ὁ ἐγώ demonstrates that the pronoun itself could be substantivized as “the I.”

The historical development is therefore not simply a change in dictionary meaning from I to self.

It is a change in what thinkers do with the word.

The pronoun that initially identifies the speaking subject can itself become the subject of investigation.

This permits a final distinction:

ἐγώ is the “I” from which a statement is made.

αὐτός identifies the same or very person or thing, and participates in the Greek system of reflexive reference.

ὁ ἐγώ turns the speaking “I” into something that can itself be questioned.

The ancient inquiry into the self emerges not from a single word, but from the philosophical possibility of asking what the first-person pronoun actually refers to.


Lexical Sources and Further Reading

The principal reference is the Logeion entry for ἐγώ, which brings together several historical dictionaries and specialized lexicons. Its resources include the following:

  1. Liddell–Scott–Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon (LSJ). The principal source for historical forms, dialectal variations, emphatic constructions, and philosophical occurrences in Plutarch, Plotinus, and Damascius. Read LSJ.
  2. Middle Liddell, An Intermediate Greek-English Lexicon. A concise reference for the core grammatical and literary usage.
  3. Diccionario Griego-Español (DGE). A historical Greek-Spanish lexicographical resource included in Logeion.
  4. Anatole Bailly, Dictionnaire grec-français. Especially useful for the distinction between emphatic and unemphatic uses, pronominal combinations, and the historical morphology. Read the entry.
  5. Grieks-Nederlands. A modern Greek-Dutch historical lexicon available through Logeion.
  6. Wilhelm Pape, Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache. A Greek-German lexical resource for classical forms and usage.
  7. Richard John Cunliffe, A Lexicon of the Homeric Dialect. A specialist reference for the Homeric forms of the pronoun.
  8. William J. Slater, Lexicon to Pindar. A specialist reference for Pindaric usage and poetic forms.
  9. Georg Autenrieth, A Homeric Dictionary. A complementary Homeric lexical resource.
  10. G. Abbott-Smith, A Manual Greek Lexicon of the New Testament. A reference for the use of ἐγώ in Koine and New Testament Greek, including explicitly emphatic constructions and Septuagintal parallels.

Primary ancient texts: Homer, Iliad 1.26–29 and Odyssey 21.207; Pindar, Olympian 4.26; Sophocles, Oedipus at Colonus 138; Aristophanes, Knights 1336; Plato, Theaetetus 166a, Sophist 239b; Alcibiades I 129–130 (disputed attribution); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4 and 9.9; Plutarch, Against Colotes 21 (1119); Galatians 2:20; John 8:58 and 9:9; Plotinus, Enneads 1.1.7–10; Damascius, De Principiis.

Modern scholarship: Pauliina Remes, Plotinus on Self: The Philosophy of the “We” (Cambridge University Press, 2007), particularly its examination of ancient Greek terminology for selfhood.

Lexical note: The historical discussion above draws directly on accessible LSJ, Bailly, and Abbott-Smith evidence, alongside the cited ancient passages and modern scholarship. The remaining Logeion dictionaries are included as relevant cross-references; their individual entries have not all been independently verified here. English renderings of the ancient examples are intended to preserve their grammatical and philosophical distinctions rather than reproduce a particular published translation.